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The present article introduces a model based on cognitive consistency principles to
predict how new identities become integrated into the self-concept, with consequences
for intergroup attitudes. The model specifies four concepts (self-concept, stereotypes,
identification, and group compatibility) as associative connections. The model builds
on two cognitive principles, balance–congruity and imbalance–dissonance, to predict
identification with social groups that people currently belong to, belonged to in the past,
or newly belong to. More precisely, the model suggests that the relative strength of
self-group associations (i.e., identification) depends in part on the (in)compatibility of the
different social groups. Combining insights into cognitive representation of knowledge,
intergroup bias, and explicit/implicit attitude change, we further derive predictions for
intergroup attitudes. We suggest that intergroup attitudes alter depending on the relative
associative strength between the social groups and the self, which in turn is determined
by the (in)compatibility between social groups. This model unifies existing models on the
integration of social identities into the self-concept by suggesting that basic cognitive
mechanisms play an important role in facilitating or hindering identity integration and
thus contribute to reducing or increasing intergroup bias.
Keywords: group change, recategorization, intergroup bias, prejudice, social identification, cognitive dissonance,
cognitive balance, identity integration
INTRODUCTION
People belong to social groups. Being a member of one social group (i.e., in-group) often implies
not to be a member of another social group (i.e., out-group). In-groups – in contrast to out-
groups – form part of the individual’s self-concept. They constitute people’s social identity (Tajfel,
1974). The distinction between in-group and out-group fosters intergroup bias and prejudice
(Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1979; Otten and Wentura, 1999; Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2001; Hewstone
et al., 2002). In most of the contemporary literature on group membership and intergroup bias,
group membership is treated as a given fact that can be more or less salient depending on contextual
factors (e.g., Brewer and Weber, 1994; Ensari and Miller, 2001; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2005;
Jones and Jetten, 2011). By implication, a given group membership should affect psychological
processes and behavior in some situations but less so in others. However, beyond such short-term
contextual fluctuations in identity salience, people also undergo long-term change in some
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of their group memberships. For example, people change working
teams, residence, or political party affiliation. They become a
non-smoker, age, or gain weight. Increasingly, people are also
geographically mobile—as reflected in the current migration
stream to European countries but also in migration between
and within counties and states all over the world (International
Organization for Migration, 2018). These changes confront
people with new identities. One of the major challenges that goes
along with migration and other changes in group membership
is that people successfully integrate new identities into their
self-concept. If integration of norms, values, and attitudes of
new and old identities fails, changes in group membership may
end in intergroup hostility and discrimination jeopardizing the
functioning of a society. Therefore, it is important to investigate
the psychological mechanisms involved in changes in group
membership.
Previous research into social identity change has focused most
strongly on short-term fluctuations in identity salience, but the
examples above highlight that some changes in group identities
are likely to be more enduring. Whereas the term “identity
salience” usually refers to recategorizing the self-depending
on temporary contextual fluctuations, with the term “group
change” in the present paper, we refer to recategorizing the self
independently from temporary contextual fluctuations. We use
group change as an umbrella term that refers to changes in
group membership from an in-group to a previous out-group in
people’s course of life. These changes in group membership have
various reasons and differ on various dimensions. Considering
the large body of research on intergroup attitudes and the
strong interest in changing intergroup bias to prevent intergroup
hostility and discrimination, it is remarkable that there is little
insight into how changing group membership, such that one
leaves one’s in-group and becomes a member of a former
out-group, affects intergroup attitudes. Even though there is
research on the effectiveness of recategorization and cross-
categorization in reducing intergroup bias, this research focuses
on the inclusiveness of salient in-groups but not on a change in
the individual’s standing as a member of one group or the other
(Brewer, 2000; Gaertner et al., 2000; Dovidio et al., 2006). With
the present article we aim to shed light on how changes in the
individual’s standing as a member of a previous and a new in-
group affects the integration of these groups into the self-concept
with consequences for intergroup attitudes. We present a model
focusing on the cognitive mechanisms that may help or hinder
the integration of new identities into the self-concept. Research
on these mechanisms can inform policy to derive strategies that
will help identity integration—and thus social cohesion—in the
face of this pressing societal concern.
Previous models provide valuable insight into distinct stages
of identity integration (Amiot et al., 2007) or types of identity
integration (e.g., Roccas and Brewer, 2002; Huynh et al., 2011).
An acculturation perspective has mostly inspired these models.
All of these models mention that the overlap or match between
cultural groups affects identity integration processes. However,
they are less explicit about how the match and mismatch between
cultures is represented in the cognitive knowledge structure
with consequences for identification and intergroup attitudes.
The present recategorization model unifies previous models by
suggesting that the integration of social groups into the self-
concept follows cognitive consistency principles. More precisely,
the present model suggests that the integration of social groups
into the self-concept depends on the (in)compatibility of a new
group membership with previous memberships and that the
more a certain group is integrated into the self-concept the more
this group is preferred to those that are less integrated into
the self-concept. Thus, the present model suggests a unifying
and general mechanism underlying the integration of previous
and new social groups into the self-concept with consequences
for implicit and explicit intergroup attitudes; the model can
be applied to cultural groups as well as all other kinds of
social groups. The sources of intergroup attitudes are, of course,
multiple and complex. They include macro-level cultural and
historical processes, interpersonal and intergroup interaction
processes, as well as motivational dynamics. In the present model,
we focus on basic cognitive processes that contribute to social
identity and to intergroup attitudes. Importantly, we do not claim
that the mechanism we focus on here is the most relevant or
the sole. However, we believe that it forms an important part
of understanding the integration of social identities into the
self-concept, intergroup attitudes, and the change of intergroup
attitudes when people change group membership.
In the following, we first review a model by Greenwald
et al. (2002) that provides the theoretical base for the present
recategorization model. Then, we present a crucial extension
of Greenwald et al.’s (2002) model to predict when people
integrate new social groups into their self-concept and outline
hypotheses derived from the recategorization model. Next,
we review literature demonstrating that group membership
contributes to implicit and explicit intergroup attitudes. We
present an inductive mechanism explaining categorization-
induced intergroup bias because of mentally associating the self-
concept with an in-group. Based on the model, we propose that
explicit as well as implicit intergroup attitudes can be affected
by changing group membership and that this effect depends
on mentally associating groups to the knowledge structure of
the self. We suggest that this process depends on cognitive
consistency principles. We argue that this recategorization model
offers an integrative and dynamic understanding of how changing
group membership affects the integration of new groups into
the self-concept and consequently intergroup attitudes. Thereby,
we connect the literature on explicit and implicit attitude
change with the literature on intergroup relations and unify
basic assumptions of previous models on identity integration.
Predictions derived from the recategorization model can inspire
systematic research on an often neglected but highly relevant
issue in contemporary societies.
OVERVIEW OF THEORY
The present recategorization model builds on the unified theory
of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-concept, and self-esteem
(Greenwald et al., 2002). Its premise is that social knowledge
is represented in associative connections between concepts and
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attributes and that the formation of cognitive associations follows
cognitive consistency principles. Greenwald et al. (2002) suggest a
balanced identity design in that information about the self, social
groups, and their attributes as well as associated valence is stored
in a cognitively consistent manner and that the cognitive system
resists forming associations that result in cognitive dissonance.
In the present model, we use the terms as specified in Greenwald
et al. (2002). Therefore, we will review the elements of their
model that are relevant to the present model before we present an
extension of it to account for the integration of social groups into
the self-concept, from which we derive predictions for intergroup
attitudes when people change group membership.
Theoretical Foundation and Definitions
The concepts that are relevant for the present model are the
self, groups, and attributes. These concepts are represented in
the model as cognitive nodes (Greenwald et al., 2002) (Figure 1
for a simplified illustration of a cognitive knowledge structure).
The Me-node, for example, contains associations that organize
information about personal experiences. Associative connections
link different concepts. These associations vary in strength. The
stronger the association, the higher the probability that cuing
one concept will result in the activation of the associated concept
(Hebb, 1949). Along these lines, “self-concept” is the term used to
represent associations of the Me-node with traits. “Self-esteem”
is closely related to the self-concept as the former represents the
overall valence of the traits that are associated with the Me-node.
“Group identification” is represented in the associations between
the Me-node and a group-node. As for all associative connections
presented here, group identification can vary in strength between
individuals who belong to the same social groups. “Intergroup
attitudes” refer to the relative evaluation of one social group
(e.g., women) compared to another social group (e.g., men).
“Evaluative intergroup bias” mirrors the preference for one social
group over another social group. Bias is grounded in stronger
associations of one social group with positive traits and less
negative traits compared to another social group.
Basic Propositions and Principles
In line with Greenwald et al. (2002), a major proposition of the
present model is that most individuals show self-positivity. Their
self is associated with more positive than negative traits and the
resulting overall valence is positive. This proposition is based on
the vast empirical evidence that shows that most people evaluate
themselves in more positive ways than others (e.g., Bosson et al.,
2000; Greenwald and Farnham, 2000; Franck et al., 2007; Olson
et al., 2007; Yamaguchi et al., 2007; Roth et al., 2012; but see
Falk and Heine, 2015, for cross-cultural differences in implicit
self-esteem). Another empirical observation that underscores this
proposition is that most people perceive themselves better than
average on dimensions that they value (Alicke and Govorun,
2005; Brown, 2012).
The present model builds on two principles that Greenwald
et al. (2002) derived from Heider’s (1958) balance theory, Osgood
and Tannenbaum’s (1955) congruity theory, and Festinger’s
(1957) cognitive dissonance theory. The first principle, the
balance–congruity principle, suggests that when two nodes in
the associative network structure are simultaneously linked to
another third node, the association between both nodes would
strengthen. For example, if the Me-node is strongly associated
with the group node women (i.e., the person identifies with
women) and strongly associated with the trait warm (i.e., the self-
concept includes the trait warm) the balance–congruity principle
will strengthen the association between women and warm (i.e.,
the group stereotypes include the trait warm). Associative
principles are supposed to work bi-directionally. Therefore, the
balance–congruity principle also predicts that when the Me-node
is associated with the group-node women and similarly women
is associated with the attribute warm, the association between
the Me-node and the attribute warm will strengthen. Similarly,
when the Me-node is associated with the attribute warm and
the group-node women is associated with the same trait, then
the balance–congruity principle will strengthen the association
between the Me-node and women (see Figure 2, upper left
triangle if Group X is replaced by women, or if Group Y is
replaced by women, the same example holds true for the right
upper triangle). The second principle, the imbalance–dissonance
principle, suggests that no associations will be formed between a
node and a third aspect of the network when this would imply
the association of two nodes that are diametrically opposed.
This principle predicts that the neural network resists forming
a strong association between the self and a social group when the
group is associated with attributes that contradict the attributes
that are associated with the self. Thus, groups that are strongly
associated with the self should share the attributes associated with
the self more than groups that are less strongly associated with
the self. When the self is associated with positive traits more than
with negative traits, then the balance–congruity principle and
the imbalance–dissonance principle predict that groups that are
associated with the self should be associated with more positive
traits than groups that are not associated with the self (Greenwald
et al., 2002).
Before we present a crucial extension of Greenwald et al.
(2002), we shortly highlight connections to what researchers
have suggested to be two distinct routes to group identification.
Previous research has pointed out that group identification is
established from two distinct routes: self-stereotyping and self-
anchoring (van Veelen et al., 2015). The present model is in
line with this literature since it is based on the proposition
that associative links work in a bidirectional way. Within the
present model, the balance–congruity principle suggests that
the association between the self and a social group, thus group
identification, strengthens when the self and the social group
share associations with traits. Self-stereotyping describes the
process that traits associated with the social group are also
associated with the self. Self-anchoring describes the process that
traits associated with the self are also associated with the social
group. Thus, associations between the self, the social group,
and traits strengthen to result in cognitive consistency between
these aspects of the knowledge structure. The present model
complements van Veelen et al.’s (2015) model on identification
processes by adding that self-stereotyping and self-anchoring are
processes leading to identification that can be understood as two
mechanisms based on the balance–congruity principle.
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FIGURE 1 | (Own visualization based on Greenwald et al., 2002) Presents an example of a very simplified associative knowledge structure that includes aspects that
correspond to the psychological constructs self-concept, self-esteem, stereotypes, prejudice, and group identification. In this example, the social group women is
most strongly associated with positive traits whereas the social group men is most strongly associated with negative traits. Thus, whereas in this simplified example
the group women is represented predominantly positively, the group men is represented mostly negatively.
A Recategorization Model
Drawing on the extensive evidence that supports cognitive
consistency principles in general and Greenwald et al.’s
(2002) model specifically (Cvencek et al., 2012), we propose a
model based on cognitive consistency processes that specifies
the integration of new social groups into the self-concept
with consequences for intergroup attitudes. The present
recategorization model is a logical extension of Greenwald
et al.’s (2002) previous model. Figure 2 depicts a balanced
identity design that includes the concepts self, attributes, and
two group-concepts, Group X and Group Y. These concepts are
illustrated as nodes. Lines that connect the nodes represent the
social-cognitive constructs group identification, self-concept,
and stereotypes. These lines represent associations between
nodes. Crucial for the present model, as new construct, we
implemented the (in)compatibility between social groups. This
construct describes whether groups align in their stereotypes,
norms, values, goals, etc. Two groups are said to be compatible
when their stereotypes, norms, values, goals, etc., are in line
with each other’s. They are incompatible when their group’s
stereotypes, norms, values, goals, etc., contradict each other or
when groups have conflicting goals or compete over resources.
For example, the group vegetarians is incompatible with the
group of carnivores, whereas the groups vegetarians and vegans
are less incompatible (or more compatible).
Recategorization, Group-(In)Compatibility, and
Stereotypes
The present recategorization model builds on the same basic
propositions and principles as outlined above. When these
principles are applied to an associative network that consists
of more than one social group then, the balance–congruity
principle suggests that a social group is associated with the self
more strongly when the group is compatible with other social
groups that already are associated with the self. Incompatibility
in this respect means that one of the social groups shares
associations to traits that are diametrically opposed to the traits
that are shared with another social group. Incompatibility may
also refer to groups that are defined as mutually exclusive such
as vegetarian and carnivore or liberals and conservatives. The
balance–congruity principle predicts that associations between
two social groups form when both groups share the associations
to the attributes. The imbalance–dissonance principle predicts
that the network will resist forming associations between two
social groups that are diametrically opposed, which means
incompatible or mutually exclusive. Thus, a new social group will
be associated more strongly with the self when it is compatible
with another social group that already shows associations with
the self. The network will refrain from forming associations with
a social group that is incompatible with another social group that
already is associated with the self (see lower triangle illustrated in
Figure 2). As outlined above, the model suggests bi-directionality
of associations. Therefore, the principles also suggest that if two
social groups are both strongly associated with the self these
groups are perceived to be more compatible with each other
than two social groups that differ in the associative strength with
the self. However, this reverse process is not essential for the
key question of how new social groups become integrated into
the self-concept. Therefore, in the following we will focus on
how (in)compatibility of a previous and a new in-group affects
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FIGURE 2 | A simplified model of identity integration. Each oval represents a
concept. Lines between concepts represent associations. The left and the
right upper triangle correspond to a balanced identity design as represented in
Greenwald et al. (2002). If a person identifies with Group X, and the self is
associated with certain attributes the balance congruity and the dissonance
imbalance principle suggest that Group X is also associated with the same
attributes. Similarly, when the self is associated with certain attributes and so
is Group X then, identification with this group strengthens. Finally, the
self-concept may also be influenced by strong identification with a Group X
that is associated with certain attributes. For example, the stereotypes that a
person associates with a social group may be associated with the self the
more a person identifies with that social group. Similarly, the traits that a
person associates with the self may be associated with the group the more
the person identifies with the group. Finally, when the same traits are ascribed
to the group and to the self the association between the self and the group
may strengthen. The same holds true for the right upper triangle if Group X is
replaced by Group Y. For a more detailed description, see text above. The
lower triangle extends the design along cognitive congruency principles. The
balance–congruity principle and the imbalance–dissonance principle predict
that only if both groups Group X and Group Y are compatible, both groups
may show strong associations with the self. If groups are incompatible with
each other only either one of both groups will show stronger associations with
the self, whereas the other group will show weaker associations with the self.
group identification rather than how group identification affects
perceived (in)compatibility between social groups.
Predictions for How Changing Social Groups Affects
Group Identification
Based on the balance–congruity and the imbalance–dissonance
principles, in the following, we derive predictions for associations
of social groups with the self (i.e., group identification), resistance
from associating social groups with the self, and a decrease in
the associative strength between one social group with the self in
favor of a stronger associative link with another social group and
the self.
Incompatible social groups imply discrepancies in group
identification
When people change from one social group to another social
group and both groups are incompatible with each other, then the
model’s balance–congruity and imbalance–dissonance principles
predict that one of the two groups will be more strongly
associated with the self than the other social group. There are two
cognitive routes that lead to discrepancies in group identification.
Dissociating the previous in-group from the self or resisting
to form associations between the self and the new in-group.
Dissociating the previous in-group from the self in favor of
the new in-group implies a shift in group identification. Both
processes lead to the same outcome: Changing groups that are
incompatible with each other leads to stronger associations of
one of the two social groups with the self than associations of
the other social group with the self. Similarly, when the previous
and the new in-groups are mutually exclusive, people will identify
more strongly with one or the other group. This leads to the first
prediction:
Hypothesis 1: Discrepancies in identification with a previous
and a new in-group will be stronger to the extent that the two
groups are incompatible.
The bi-directional nature of the model implies the prediction
that when people strongly identify with one social group but
disidentify with another social group these two groups are
perceived as more incompatible than two social groups that
people identify similarly strong with.
On the one hand, changes in group membership can be
imposed by external pressure. For example, a person may be
forced into unemployment and find himself or herself as a welfare
recipient despite having strongly integrated an employee identity
into the self-concept. Since a welfare recipient identity precludes
an employee identity—both social groups are diametrically
opposed and thus, incompatible with each other or mutually
exclusive—people either associate the employee identity more
strongly with their self or they associate the welfare recipient
identity more strongly with their self. Which of both social
groups is more strongly associated with the self depends on
which of the social groups shares attributes that are associated
with the self. Thus, if a person describes herself or himself as
hardworking, independent, and successful, the cognitive network
of this person resists forming strong associations with welfare
recipients. On the other hand, a person may choose to become
member of a new social group. Similarly, then, the associations
between the social groups and the self are determined by the
incompatibility between the new in-group and the previous in-
group. For example, a person who was a carnivore and chooses
to become a vegetarian associates carnivores or vegetarians more
strongly with the self in order to maintain cognitive consistency.
When people choose a new group membership, however, they
may already associate the self with traits that are more strongly
associated with the new in-group than with the former one. Then,
the previous in-group is dissociated from the self in favor for the
new in-group being associated with the self to maintain cognitive
consistency.
Hypothesis 2: When a new in-group is incompatible with a
previous in-group, identification with the new in-group will be
stronger if people choose to become a member of the new in-
group than if they were forced to become a member of the new
in-group.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 April 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 479
fpsyg-09-00479 April 3, 2018 Time: 17:42 # 6
Roth et al. Cognitive Consistency Based Recategorization Model
Compatible social groups imply expanding identities
When people change from one social group to another social
group and both groups are compatible with each other or
overlapping, then the model predicts that both groups are
associated with the self to a similar extent. As was the case for
incompatible identities, changes in group membership between
compatible identities can be imposed. For example, a person
may be forced into another employment despite having strongly
integrated a previous employee identity into the self-concept.
If both employee identities share central characteristics—both
social groups are compatible with each other—people associate
the new employee identity in accordance with the previous
employee identity with the self. Similarly, when the previous
and the new in-groups are highly overlapping, people may
identify in similarly strong ways with both groups. Thus, if a
person describes herself or himself as hardworking, independent,
and successful, and these characteristics are associated with
the previous as well as with the new employee identity, then
the cognitive network expands, forming association with the
new in-group in accordance with the previous in-group. If a
person chooses to become a member of a new social group,
similarly the associations between the social groups and the self
are determined by the compatibility between the new in-group
and the previous in-group. To draw on the above-mentioned
example, a person who was a vegetarian and chooses to become
vegan simultaneously associates vegetarians and vegans with the
self when both are compatible.
Hypothesis 3: Compatibility of new in-groups with previous
in-groups that people already show strong identification with
will result in similarly strong identification with the new and
the previous in-groups irrespective of whether the new in-
groups are chosen or imposed.
Before we derive hypotheses for how changing group
membership affects intergroup attitudes, we will summarize
established findings on how group membership and group
identification contribute to intergroup attitudes.
GROUP IDENTIFICATION AND
INTERGROUP ATTITUDES
As stated above, people form stronger associations between
the self and social groups that share the attributes that are
associated with the self (also see Turner et al., 1987). The
premise that most people have positive self-esteem implies that
associations of positive traits with the self are stronger than
associations of negative traits with the self. Based on the balance–
congruity and the imbalance–dissonance principles, people will
identify more strongly with groups that share self-associated
positive traits. Correspondingly, the self-associated groups will
be evaluated more positively than self-dissociated groups (i.e.,
in-group favoritism). This effect should be augmented the more
positive people’s personal self-esteem is.
Several pieces of evidence support these propositions. In
studies on the roots of intergroup bias, researchers often
categorize participants into one of two different groups, based
on an ostensible test on arbitrary personal characteristics that
people share with a group of other people (e.g., “figure-oriented
information processors” versus “ground-oriented processors”;
Tajfel et al., 1971; Otten and Moskowitz, 2000). Immediately
afterward, they assess attitudes toward both groups using
either self-report questionnaires or reaction time procedures.
The assessed explicit and implicit intergroup attitudes typically
reflect a preference for the in-group over the out-group (e.g.,
Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2001). Even though different reasons
have been suggested for how categorization contributes to
preferences for in-groups (Hewstone et al., 2002), positive self-
esteem is one of the established reasons (Cadinu and Rothbart,
1996; Gramzow and Gaertner, 2005; DiDonato et al., 2011;
Roth and Steffens, 2014). In line with this account, research
has demonstrated that individuals describe novel in-groups
with traits that they also ascribe to themselves (Otten and
Wentura, 2001; Otten, 2003). Research also has shown that
people use self-ascribed traits to describe well-established in-
groups such as gender groups (Otten and Epstude, 2006).
Additionally, studies have shown that the more positive a
person’s self-esteem, the more they prefer in-groups to out-
groups (Aberson et al., 2000; also see Rudman et al., 2001).
The evidence suggests that associating the self and social groups
plays an important role in explicit (Gramzow and Gaertner,
2005) as well as implicit intergroup bias (Roth and Steffens,
2014). Additionally, these predictions have been supported using
connectionist simulations (Vanhoomissen and Van Overwalle,
2010). Altogether, research has provided clear evidence that
explicit and implicit preferences for self-associated groups (i.e.,
in-groups) over self-dissociated groups (out-groups) form in
line with the balance–congruity principle and the imbalance–
dissonance principle (Greenwald et al., 2002; Dunham, 2013;
Cvencek et al., 2016).
Predictions for How Changing Group
Membership Affects Intergroup Attitudes
Within the present model, we suggest that changes in group
membership modify the associative structure among the self,
traits, and social groups in line with the balance–congruity
principle and the imbalance dissonance principle. These
principles suggest that if a new in-group is compatible with
previous in-groups the network forms associations between the
self and the new in-group that coexists with associations of the
previous in-groups and the self. If, however, the new in-group is
incompatible with previous in-groups that are already associated
with the self, the network resists forming associations with the
new in-group or it dissociates previous in-groups from the self
in favor of associating the new in-group with the self (see
Hypotheses 1–3). How will these processes affect intergroup
attitudes?
The predictions of the model for intergroup attitudes are
straightforward. Based on the premise that most people have
positive self-esteem, people will associate more strongly social
groups with the self that share positive traits than groups that are
associated with negative traits. Based on the balance–congruity
principle the groups that are simultaneously associated with traits
that are shared with the self will be evaluated in line with the self
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and thus, more positively than social groups that are less strongly
associated with the self. Thus, the model implies that intergroup
bias among compatible in-groups declines whereas in the case of
incompatible in-groups people will show intergroup bias in favor
of the group that is more strongly associated with the self.
Hypothesis 4: All else being equal, attitudes will be more
positive toward the in-group (previous in-group or new in-
group) that people identify more strongly with compared to
the in-group (previous in-group or new in-group) that people
identify less strongly with.
Hypothesis 5: Intergroup bias between a previous in-group
and a new in-group will be stronger to the extent that the two
groups are incompatible.
Previous research shows some preliminary evidence in
support of Hypothesis 4 (Clement and Krueger, 2002; Sassenberg
and Wieber, 2005). In the model, we have specified two
ends of a continuum of changes in group membership. First,
we considered changes of group membership that result in
dissociating the original in-group from the self while the original
out-group becomes associated to the self. In the laboratory,
these situations have been created by categorizing people into
one of two unfamiliar social groups, for example, by the bogus
psychological test mentioned above (Otten and Wentura, 1999).
Afterward, these people were informed about a more precise test
of membership that revealed their opposite group membership
(Clement and Krueger, 2002). In one of our studies, we informed
people about a mistaken first assignment because of computer
malfunction (Roth, 2010). In these situations, the model predicts
that intergroup bias will flip – because group membership is the
only information about the social groups and consequently only
the group that people share membership with is associated with
the self. To our knowledge, only one published experiment has
investigated effects of changing membership between in-group
and out-group (Clement and Krueger, 2002). In this experiment,
reassigning group membership changed which of the groups
participants projected their own opinion on: Irrespective of
prior group membership, participants projected to their new
in-group (original out-group). Even though this experiment
did not directly focus on intergroup attitudes, it provides
preliminary evidence that cognitions about social groups switch
when membership in unfamiliar social groups changes and the
out-group is associated with the self instead of the previous
in-group.
Outside the laboratory, however, situations in which people
completely dissociate a previous in-group from the self could
be rare. Instead, people may change group membership and
associate a new in-group with their self but keep residual
associations with the previous in-group due to its association with
significant autobiographical memories. Thus, the new in-group
is associated with the positive self in addition to the previous
in-group. Consequently, in this case intergroup bias should be
weaker because both groups are associated with the self. However,
the imbalance–dissonance principle suggests that either the
previous in-group or the new in-group is dissociated from the
self the more incompatible the groups are with each other.
Dissociating the previous in-group from the self while associating
the new in-group with the self will result in preferences for the
new in-group over the previous in-group; whereas dissociating
the new in-group from the self, while associating the previous
in-group with the self will result in preferences for the previous
in-group. Likewise, the model’s balance–congruity principle
suggests simultaneously strong associations of the self and the
previous in-group as well as the new in-group when both groups
are compatible which will result in a decline of intergroup bias.
We have elaborated on two ends of what we suggest to be
a continuum of changes in group membership. In summary,
the model suggests that the relative attitude toward a previous
in-group and a new in-group changes depending on the
(in)compatibility of the social groups. We believe that most kinds
of changes of group membership affect the relative association
of the self with the previous and new in-groups with effects on
intergroup attitudes. Furthermore, with respect to groups that
people never belonged to, we derive the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6: The group people were a member of and the
group they become a member of will be evaluated more
positively than social groups that people have not been a
member of at any point in time.
RESISTANT VERSUS MALLEABLE
INTERGROUP ATTITUDES
Research during the last decades has distinguished more
automatic and less reflective attitudes (i.e., implicit attitudes)
from less automatic and more reflective attitudes (i.e., explicit
attitudes). Explicit attitudes are usually measured with self-
report questionnaires. Answering questionnaires allows research
participants to control and adjust their answers to what they
consider an appropriate or correct attitude. Therefore, explicit
attitudes are sensitive to social desirability and other controlled
influences on attitudes. Implicit attitudes are measured indirectly,
usually without the participant knowing the precise purpose
of the task. Implicit attitudes are often inferred from reaction
time differences in simple categorization tasks (e.g., Implicit
Association Test, Greenwald et al., 1998; evaluative priming,
Fazio, 1995). In general, implicit attitudes are considered to
reflect more directly the underlying associative base of an
attitude than explicit attitudes do (Fazio and Olson, 2003; Conrey
et al., 2005; Gawronski and Sritharan, 2010). Distinguishing
between implicit and explicit attitudes can help understanding
of why people’s attitude toward a social group in one situation
differs from their attitude toward the same group in a different
situation.
In line with this approach, models of implicit and explicit
attitudes share the assumption that implicit and explicit attitudes
can differ. However, it is still debated why and when they differ.
Early theory conceptualized implicit attitudes as unconscious,
and therefore not available to introspection, which is suggested
to be a precondition for explicit attitudes (Greenwald and
Banaji, 1995). Other models propose two different systems that
hardly communicate. Within these models, the implicit attitude
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is claimed to be overlearned and stored in a distinct system.
It is considered to be difficult to change whereas the explicit
attitude is easily updated in response to new information (e.g.,
Wilson et al., 2000; Rydell and McConnell, 2006). In contrast
to these claims, evidence has accumulated that people are well
aware of their implicit attitudes and that they are able to
introspect about them (Hahn et al., 2014). Furthermore, implicit
attitudes are less stable over time than explicit attitudes, which
speaks against the hypothesis that implicit attitudes are in
general overlearned and harder to change than explicit attitudes
(Gawronski et al., 2017). Finally, research shows that implicit and
explicit attitudes correlate depending on boundary conditions
such as motivation and cognitive resources (Amodio et al.,
2003; Hofmann et al., 2005). Some other models that coincide
with these findings suggest two different systems or processes
that do interact (e.g., Strack and Deutsch, 2004; Cunningham
et al., 2007) and that operating conditions determine whether
implicit and explicit attitudes diverge or converge (Olson and
Fazio, 2009). Two of these models specifically address attitude
change (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006; Petty et al., 2007).
Both models suggest that implicit attitudes more directly reflect
the underlying associative structure than explicit attitudes.
Furthermore, implicit attitudes serve as the basis for explicit
attitudes, unless the information implied by the implicit attitude
is rejected because of its inconsistency with other considered
information. If information that is considered valid diverges from
whichever associative structure is automatically activated, the
implicit attitude reflects the automatic activated pattern whereas
the explicit attitude is adjusted to the information considered to
be valid (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2007). Most importantly,
these models suggest that changes in the associative structure
are reflected more directly in the implicit attitude whereas the
explicit attitude additionally reflects information deemed to be
valid.
Experimental evidence on the resistance versus malleability of
implicit attitudes compared to explicit attitudes is ambiguous.
Importantly, these divergent outcomes resulted from very
different attitude manipulations (also see Rudman, 2004).
Some studies provided information to participants that a
recently established attitude was based on mistaken descriptive
information (e.g., Gregg et al., 2006), whereas other studies used
evaluative conditioning to change attitudes (e.g., Dijksterhuis,
2004). Whilst evaluative conditioning changed implicit attitudes
but not explicit ones (e.g., Rydell et al., 2006; Grumm et al., 2009),
verbal information changed explicit attitudes but not implicit
ones (e.g., Gregg et al., 2006; Rydell et al., 2006). In sum, studies
suggest that implicit and explicit attitude change can depend
on the approach used to alter attitudes and on the processes
involved in the respective approach (e.g., Mann and Ferguson,
2015; Wyer, 2016). In our reading, implicit attitudes change when
the associative pattern changes, whereas corresponding changes
in explicit attitudes will be moderated depending on whatever
is considered valid (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2011) or
appropriate (Olson and Fazio, 2009).
Will changing group membership and the resulting change
in self-group associations affect explicit and implicit intergroup
attitudes similarly? In line with established attitude models
(Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006; Petty et al., 2007), we
expect changes in the associative structure among the self,
attributes, and the social groups to be reflected more directly in
implicit intergroup attitudes. Thus, the effect of changes in group
membership and its resulting effect on self-group associations in
line with the balance–congruity and the imbalance–dissonance
principles should more strongly be observed on implicit
intergroup attitudes. These changes will not necessarily show
in explicit intergroup attitudes. Explicit intergroup attitudes
will depend on what information people consider most valid.
Importantly, several sources influence what people consider valid
information about a social group when they become a member
themselves (e.g., Abrams and Hogg, 1988; Hogg and Abrams,
1993). These validation processes (Gawronski and Bodenhausen,
2011) can overwrite effects of associations between the self and
the previous and the new in-group membership on their explicit
intergroup attitudes.
Briefly, we suggest that associating the self to a previous out-
group by changing group membership is a mechanism by which
implicit intergroup attitudes can switch when the previous in-
group is disconnected from the self. Implicit intergroup bias
should decline when a new in-group is associated similarly strong
with the self than the previous in-group. When groups differ on
other dimensions in addition to the relative associations between
the self and each of the groups, self-group associations will
alter the implicit intergroup attitude. However, group stereotypes
and any validating forces should influence explicit intergroup
attitudes because explicit attitudes reflect the information that
people consider most valid and appropriate (Gawronski and
Bodenhausen, 2006). This leads us to our final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 7: Effects on intergroup attitudes as stated in
Hypotheses 4 and 5 will be shown more clearly in measures
that more proximally assess associative patterns underlying
attitudes than on self-reported attitudes.
INTEGRATION WITH THEORIES ON
MULTIPLE IDENTITIES
The present model complements previous theories on identity
change and multiple social identities. Previous models have
suggested that identity integration depends on the compatibility
or overlap of social groups (e.g., Benet-Martínez and Haritatos,
2005; Amiot et al., 2007) and that a non-overlap between social
groups goes along with intrapsychic conflicts, discrimination
and reduced well-being (Amiot et al., 2015). The present model
suggests that these relationships can be traced back to the
representation of the self and social groups in the mental
knowledge structure. The model builds on cognitive consistency
principles in the formation and change of mental associations
among concepts. Research has demonstrated that cognitive
dissonance is reflected in a tension and negative emotions
(Levy et al., 2017) which is in line with the assumption that
incompatibility of social identities goes along with negative
outcomes. The present model specifies cognitive mechanisms
that contribute to the developmental stages of identity integration
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described in the model of Amiot et al. (2007). It also accounts
for the suggestion in work on bicultural identity integration by
Benet-Martínez and Haritatos (2005) that the perceived distance
between two cultures goes along with acculturation stress and
identification with either one instead of both cultures (Benet-
Martínez and Haritatos, 2005). Thus, the present model provides
a general framework on the underlying cognitive mechanisms
involved in integrating multiple social identities as specified by
previous models.
Another prominent model that addresses the integration
of multiple social groups into the self-concept is the identity
complexity model by Roccas and Brewer (2002). These authors
suggest that the less identities overlap (thus, the less compatible
they are) the more complex will be the representation of
in-groups in the mental knowledge structure and that this
complexity is beneficial for people’s well-being and for intergroup
relations. At first glance, this prediction seems to be at odds
with the present model. The present model suggests that
incompatibility between social groups results in discrepancies
in the strength of identification with the groups: People
will identify with one of the incompatible in-groups more
strongly than with the other one. Furthermore, according
to the present model, people should show preferences for
the group that is more strongly associated with the self
than with groups that are less strongly associated with the
self. However, when people are members of different social
groups that contradict each other in some characteristics,
other characteristics may counteract dissociating any one of
the social groups from the self. In order to restore cognitive
consistency without dissociating any one of these in-groups
from the self may result in a differentiation of social groups.
For example, if a person identifies with women and similarly
identifies with math majors, differentiating the concept women
into math-affiliated women and math-opposing women can
reduce dissonance between both in-groups (to apply this
mechanism to stereotype threat theory, compare to Schmader
et al., 2008). Thus, when incompatibility between social groups
repeatedly leads to cognitive dissonance and disidentification
with any one of the conflicted group memberships is not
possible, these pressured concepts will tend to split into
subconcepts (Greenwald et al., 2002). This dissonance resolving
differentiation process may account for the premise of Roccas
and Brewer’s (2002) identity complexity model. Thus, whereas
the present model makes clear predictions about relative group
identification with (in)compatible in-groups, incompatibility
between in-groups may progressively be resolved by a process of
differentiation.
Interestingly, Crisp and Turner (2011) have suggested that
being confronted with multiple social identities results in
flexible inhibition of stereotypes. These authors argued that
the incompatibility of different in-groups’ stereotypes can be
progressively resolved by repeated confrontation resulting in
flexible inhibition of stereotypes. Although the authors reviewed
convincing evidence on the perception of out-group members
that disconfirm existing stereotypes, there seems to be only little
evidence on whether the same processes hold true for conflicting
in-groups. Therefore, it is an interesting question whether the
perceived incompatibility of in-groups is resolved in the ways
suggested by Crisp and Turner (2011).
IMPLICATIONS FOR REDUCING
INTERGROUP BIAS
Reducing intergroup bias is important, and policy makers
undertake efforts toward this goal. Moreover, in contemporary
societies changing group membership is common. The causes of
intergroup bias (and changing group membership) are complex
and we are looking at just one aspect of this. Hence, there will
be many possible strategies for reducing bias, and we are not
suggesting that our model provides a full solution. However,
based on the model we address some points that could be helpful.
First, in line with previous research, the present model claims
that group identification is a driving force of intergroup bias
(Sassenberg and Wieber, 2005). Second, the model provides a
framework specifying when and how intergroup bias can alter,
based on changes of group membership. We do not suggest that
the relative strength of self-group associations is the only source
of intergroup bias, but it can serve as a resource for altering
explicit as well as implicit intergroup bias. Therefore, the model
suggests that any intervention that helps perceiving similarities
among several social groups and that fit with people’s self-concept
can be effective in reducing intergroup bias between these
groups. These predictions of the present model are in line with
Gaertner and Dovidio’s (2012) common in-group identification
model. These authors suggest that perceiving out-groups as
part of a broader inclusive in-group reduces intergroup bias.
Whereas their model focuses on the hierarchical integration
of social identities into the self-concept with consequences for
social groups that are included in an overarching category, the
present model focusses on intergroup attitudes among groups
that people are member of or have been member of at a
certain point in time. Thus, both approaches complement each
other.
An example of evidence in line with the present model is
that exchange programs for students reduced intergroup bias by
increasing the overlap between students enrolled in the program
and the respective national out-group (Sassenberg and Matschke,
2010). From the perspective of the present model, exchange
programs can be one way of highlighting commonalities between
nationalities. Consequently, the foreign nationality and the
original nationality can both become associated with the self-
concept, resulting in a decline of intergroup bias (for similar
findings, see extended contact effects, e.g., Wright et al., 1997).
This is in line with cross-categorization models that suggest that
double in-groups (e.g., a German US citizen) are evaluated more
positively than cross-categories that include only one in-group
and an out-group (e.g., Hewstone et al., 1993). When the person
self-associates with Germans and United States citizens both
social groups are associated with traits that are shared with the
self. However, when only one of the groups is associated with
the self and the other social group is incompatible with that
in-group, the crossed category should be evaluated less in line
with self-ascribed attributes.
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The processes outlined in the present model mirror those
described in models on the effect of perspective taking on
out-group attitudes (e.g., Todd and Burgmer, 2013). In fact, it
appears that the suggested mechanisms involved in changing
group membership may also account for reduction of bias when
people take the perspective of another person. Thus, the present
model suggests that perspective taking will be more effective in
improving out-group attitudes when the out-group is compatible
instead of incompatible with relevant in-groups.
The present model contributes to understanding the
formation and change of intergroup bias. It helps predicting
when and how changes of group membership affect intergroup
attitudes. This knowledge can inform the important societal
issue of intergroup bias in a world where some group boundaries
are becoming more malleable. The model suggests simple
mechanisms, based on cognitive consistency principles, implying
that new in-groups that are compatible with previous in-groups
are associated with the self in line with previous identities
and that associating social groups to this knowledge structure
increases liking for these groups. Strengthening and reducing
these connections can increase and decrease bias between social
groups. Interventions that help highlighting commonalities
instead of contradictions between social groups and thereby
help the integration of new groups into the self-concept in line
with previous identities may help changing intergroup bias.
This has important implications for assimilation policies in
multi-cultural countries. Policies should encourage compatibility
between previous and new identities. This implies that people
from different cultures need to go to the same schools, hold
similar jobs, and live in similar places. It discourages any kind
of segregation since this may increase incompatibility between
previous and new group memberships. Since compatibility
between social groups may be reached by assimilating a minority
group membership to a majority group but also vice versa, it
could be a promising strategy to make salient aspects of the
majority’s preexisting identity that are consistent with including
the minority in their group (also see Smeekes and Verkuyten,
2015). These strategies may help to reach an identity integration
stage that implies high involvement in the culture of origin as
well as the new cultural in-group (Berry, 1997) and represents the
most adaptive of four different acculturation categories (Berry,
2005).
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The present model builds on cognitive consistency principles in
social cognition to explain the integration of new identities into
the self-concept with consequences for intergroup bias. Based
on these established mechanisms, the present model suggests
that group identification is represented in the mental knowledge
structure by an associative link between the self and the in-group.
The model suggests that changes in group membership affect
the cognitive representation of the self and the in-group and
out-group depending on group (in)compatibility that in turn
affects intergroup attitudes. We stated hypotheses that we believe
are the crucial or most interesting ones for the question how
changes in group membership affect group identification and
intergroup bias, but this is not an exhaustive list of hypothesizes
that can be derived from the model. Systematic research is
warranted to test the hypotheses derived from the model. In
a first step, this could be done by using minimal groups to
which people are assigned and reassigned (Clement and Krueger,
2002). Minimal groups have the advantage that people do not
have previous stereotypes or experiences with these groups.
This opens up the possibility to manipulate group stereotypes,
norms, values, and goals to be compatible or incompatible
between the social groups. Furthermore, additional variables
such as group member’s experiences with these groups or
duration of group membership can be manipulated. In order
to address concerns with external validity of minimal group
experiments, research should test the model’s prediction with
existing groups and memberships. Thus, in a second step, the
variables of interest could be measured or quasi-experimentally
manipulated. Finally, longitudinal research on changes in group
membership could show these change processes occurring
naturally.
Notably, several motivational, situational, and interindividual
differences may influence the strength of the mental association
between the self and the original in-group as well as the self
and the new in-group. In this paragraph, we mention some
of the factors that could be addressed in future research. We
believe that one crucial variable that influences the strength
of the association between the self and a social group is
the duration of the respective group membership. Whereas a
continuous history of a person as member of a social group
may intensify the association between the self and that group,
a short-term membership without much meaning may work
to the contrary. Short-term group membership may end up
in a loose association between the self and the group that
is more easily overwritten when membership changes; more
permanent group membership may strengthen the connection
(Sanchez et al., 2007). Autobiographical memory about the
self as a member of a social group that goes along with an
extensive duration of group membership may affect attitudes
toward that group long after the person left that group. This
should be particularly the case when the previous in-group
shares stable characteristics with the self. For example, when
people are forced to change their group membership and
the new in-group is incompatible with the previous in-group
people will show stronger associations with the previous in-
group than with the new in-group (e.g., Jetten and Hutchison,
2011).
Furthermore, motivational processes may play a role in
associating or dissociating a social group to/from the self.
Research has shown that people identify with social groups
to satisfy basic motives (Vignoles et al., 2006, 2008). Thus,
people may more strongly associate social groups to their self-
concept that fulfill their motives for self-esteem, distinctiveness,
continuity, and meaning, whereas social groups that do not
satisfy these motives may be associated less strongly to the
self-concept. These motives may be reflected in variations of
how much people voluntarily belong to a social group. Similarly,
group membership based on shared opinion between the self and
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a social group may lead to strong identification with opinion-
based groups with the result of strong intergroup bias toward
the opposing group and consequences for collective action (Bliuc
et al., 2007). In general, we predict that the more people want to
belong to a social group the stronger they will identify with this
group and thus, show a stronger association between the self and
the social group. This has consequences for intergroup attitudes;
the chosen in-group will be evaluated positively and because
of its incompatibility with opponent groups, the latter may be
devalued. It is another interesting question to test whether social
groups that people disidentify with as measured with explicit
measures (Becker and Tausch, 2014) can still be associated with
the self-influencing intergroup attitudes (Kachanoff et al., 2016).
The present model suggests that the more positive people’s self-
esteem is the stronger their intergroup bias will be in favor of the
group that is more strongly connected with the self. This process
does not preclude additional motivational processes such as the
deliberate selection of positive characteristics when describing
the in-group compared to the out-group. Future research could
test the relative contribution of these processes to intergroup bias.
Finally, a central proposition of the model is that most people’s
self-esteem is positive and that associating the self with a social
group therefore contributes to a preference of the self-associated
over a self-dissociated social group. However, some people’s self-
esteem is negative; future research should test the generalizability
of the predictions derived from the present model across various
populations (e.g., people with affective disorders or those who
belong to stigmatized groups).
CONCLUSION
We presented a parsimonious model on how changes of group
membership are reflected in cognitive representations of the
self, traits, and the group’s (in)compatibility that in turn can
alter implicit and also explicit intergroup bias. However, the
influence on explicit intergroup bias is also affected by what
a person considers an appropriate attitude in the respective
situation. Our cognitive consistency based recategorization
model suggests that any group that is associated with the
self-profits from self-associated positive valence and is thus
represented more positively than groups that are linked less
strongly or are dissociated from the self. Based on established
cognitive consistency principles and on previous research on
categorization-induced intergroup bias, self-anchoring, and dual
process perspectives on attitudes, the present model suggests that
not only explicit but also implicit intergroup bias is flexible, and
that it depends on associating social groups to the individual’s
self-concept. The model suggests that self-association is a process
that in addition to established mechanisms like evaluative
conditioning can effectively change the associative structure
underlying the self-concept and social groups. Altogether,
changing group membership can be an effective strategy in
altering reflected as well as more automatic forms of intergroup
bias – at least when boundaries between groups are permeable.
Given that contemporary societies are characterized by frequent
changes of group memberships, be it related to jobs, professions,
cities, or countries, this article aims to shift from a relatively
‘static’ consideration of social group memberships in the here and
now to a more ‘flexible’ view of group memberships as changing
through space and time. In modern society, group memberships
change, and so do social identities. Given that social identities
are important aspects of the individual’s self-concept, identity
change is complex and important. The suggested model provides
a framework from which innovative testable predictions can
be derived and tested that in turn help to explain and predict
societally relevant contemporary issues of modern life.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
JR drafted the manuscript. MS and VV provided critical revision
of the manuscript. All authors approved the final manuscript.
FUNDING
This publication was funded by the German Research Foundation
(DFG) and the University of Würzburg in the funding program
Open Access Publishing.
REFERENCES
Aberson, C. L., Healy, M., and Romero, V. (2000). Ingroup bias and self-
esteem: a meta-analysis. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 4, 157–173. doi: 10.1207/
S15327957PSPR0402_04
Abrams, D., and Hogg, M. A. (1988). Comments on the motivational status of self-
esteem in social identity and intergroup discrimination. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 18,
317–334. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2420180403
Alicke, M. D., and Govorun, O. (2005). “The better-than-average effect,” in The
Self in Social Judgment, eds M. D. Alicke, D. A. Dunning, and J. I. Krueger
(New York, NY: Taylor and Francis), 85–106.
Allport, G. W. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Amiot, C. E., De La Sablonniere, R., Smith, L. G., and Smith, J. R. (2015). Capturing
changes in social identities over time and how they become part of the self-
concept. Soc. Pers. Psychol. Compass 9, 171–187. doi: 10.1111/spc3.12169
Amiot, C. E., De La Sablonniere, R., Terry, D. J., and Smith, J. R. (2007). Integration
of social identities in the self: toward a cognitive-developmental model. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. Rev. 11, 364–388. doi: 10.1177/1088868307304091
Amodio, D. M., Harmon-Jones, E., and Devine, P. G. (2003). Individual differences
in the activation and control of affective race bias as assessed by startle eyeblink
response and self-report. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 84, 738–753. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.84.4.738
Ashburn-Nardo, L., Voils, C. I., and Monteith, M. J. (2001). Implicit associations as
the seeds of intergroup bias: how easily do they take root? J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
81, 789–799. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.81.5.789
Becker, J. C., and Tausch, N. (2014). When group memberships are negative:
the concept, measurement, and behavioral implications of psychological
disidentification. Self Identity 13, 294–321. doi: 10.1080/15298868.2013.
819991
Benet-Martínez, V., and Haritatos, J. (2005). Bicultural identity integration (BII):
components and psychosocial antecedents. J. Pers. 73, 1015–1050. doi: 10.1111/
j.1467-6494.2005.00337.x
Berry, J. W. (1997). Immigration, acculturation, and adaptation. Appl. Psychol. 46,
5–34. doi: 10.1111/j.1464-0597.1997.tb01087.x
Berry, J. W. (2005). Acculturation: living successfully in two cultures. Int. J.
Intercult. Relat. 29, 697–712. doi: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2005.07.013
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 April 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 479
fpsyg-09-00479 April 3, 2018 Time: 17:42 # 12
Roth et al. Cognitive Consistency Based Recategorization Model
Bliuc, A. M., McGarty, C., Reynolds, K., and Muntele, D. (2007). Opinion-based
group membership as a predictor of commitment to political action. Eur. J. Soc.
Psychol. 37, 19–32. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.334
Bosson, J. K., Swann, W. B., and Pennebaker, J. W. (2000). Stalking the
perfect measure of implicit self-esteem: the blind men and the elephant
revisited? J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 79, 631–643. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.79.
4.631
Brewer, M. B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: a
cognitive-motivational analysis. Psychol. Bull. 86, 307–324. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.86.2.307
Brewer, M. B. (2000). “Reducing prejudice through cross-categorization: effects
of multiple social identities,” in Claremont Symposium on Applied Social
Psychology: Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination, ed. S. Oskamp (Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage), 165–183.
Brewer, M. B., and Weber, J. G. (1994). Self-evaluation effects of interpersonal
versus intergroup social comparison. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 66, 268–275.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.66.2.268
Brown, J. D. (2012). Understanding the better than average effect: motives
(Still) matter. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 38, 209–219. doi: 10.1177/014616721143
2763
Cadinu, M. R., and Rothbart, M. (1996). Self-anchoring and differentiation
processes in the minimal group setting. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 70, 661–677.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.70.4.661
Clement, R. W., and Krueger, J. (2002). Social categorization moderates
social projection. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 38, 219–231. doi: 10.1006/jesp.2001.
1503
Conrey, F. R., Sherman, J. W., Gawronski, B., Hugenberg, K., and Groom,
C. J. (2005). Separating multiple processes in implicit social cognition: the
quad model of implicit task performance. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 89, 469–487.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.89.4.469
Crisp, R. J., and Turner, R. N. (2011). Cognitive adaptation to the experience
of social and cultural diversity. Psychol. Bull. 137, 242–266. doi: 10.1037/a002
1840
Cunningham, W. A., Zelazo, P. D., Packer, D. J., and Van Bavel, J. J.
(2007). The iterative reprocessing model: a multilevel framework for
attitudes and evaluation. Soc. Cogn. 25, 736–760. doi: 10.1521/soco.2007.25.
5.736
Cvencek, D., Greenwald, A. G., and Meltzoff, A. N. (2012). “Balanced identity
theory: review of evidence for implicit consistency in social cognition,” in
From Cognitive Consistency: A Fundamental Principle in Social Cognition,
eds B. Gawronski and F. Strack (New York, NY: The Guilford Press),
157–177.
Cvencek, D., Greenwald, A. G., and Meltzoff, A. N. (2016). Implicit measures
for preschool children confirm self-esteem’s role in maintaining a balanced
identity. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 62, 50–57. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2015.09.015
DiDonato, T. E., Ullrich, J., and Krueger, J. I. (2011). Social perception as
induction and inference: an integrative model of intergroup differentiation,
ingroup favoritism, and differential accuracy. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 100, 66–85.
doi: 10.1037/a0021051
Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). I like myself but I don’t know why: enhancing implicit self-
esteem by subliminal evaluative conditioning. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 86, 345–355.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.86.2.345
Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., Hodson, G., Riek, B. M., Johnson, K. M.,
and Houlette, M. (2006). “Recategorization and crossed categorization: the
implications of group salience and representations for reducing bias,” in
Multiple Social Categorization: Processes, Models and Applications, eds R. J.
Crisp, M. Hewstone, R. J. Crisp, and M. Hewstone (New York, NY: Psychology
Press), 65–89.
Dunham, Y. (2013). Balanced identity in the minimal groups paradigm. PLoS One
8:e84205. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0084205
Ensari, N., and Miller, N. (2001). Decategorization and the reduction of bias in the
cross categorization paradigm. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 31, 193–216. doi: 10.1002/
ejsp.42
Falk, C. F., and Heine, S. J. (2015). What is implicit self-esteem, and does
it vary across cultures? Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 19, 177–198. doi: 10.1177/
1088868314544693
Fazio, R. H. (1995). “Attitudes as object-evaluation associations: determinants,
consequences, and correlates of attitude accessibility,” in Attitude Strength:
Antecedents and Consequences, eds R. E. Petty and J. A. Krosnick (Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum), 247–282.
Fazio, R. H., and Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cognition
research: their meaning and uses. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 54, 297–327. doi: 10.1146/
annurev.psych.54.101601.145225
Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Franck, E., Raedt, R. D., and de Houwer, J. D. (2007). Implicit but not explicit
self-esteem predicts future depressive symptomatology. Behav. Res. Ther. 45,
2448–2455. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2007.01.008
Gaertner, S. L., and Dovidio, J. F. (2005). “Categorization, recategorization, and
intergroup bias,” in Reflecting on the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years after Allport,
eds J. F. Dovidio, P. Glick, and L. A. Rudman (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing),
71–88.
Gaertner, S. L., and Dovidio, J. F. (2012). “The common ingroup identity model,”
in Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology, Vol. 2, eds P. A. M. Van Lange,
A. W. Kruglanski, and E. T. Higgins (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications
Ltd), 439–457. doi: 10.4135/9781446249222.n48
Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Banker, B. S., Houlette, M., Johnson, K. M., and
McGlynn, E. A. (2000). Reducing intergroup conflict: From superordinate goals
to decategorization, recategorization, and mutual differentiation. Group Dyn. 4,
98–114. doi: 10.1037/1089-2699.4.1.98
Gawronski, B., and Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and propositional
processes in evaluation: an integrative review of implicit and explicit
attitude change. Psychol. Bull. 132, 692–731. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.132.
5.692
Gawronski, B., and Bodenhausen, G. V. (2007). Unraveling the processes
underlying evaluation: attitudes from the perspective of the APE model. Soc.
Cogn. 25, 687–717. doi: 10.1521/soco.2007.25.5.687
Gawronski, B., and Bodenhausen, G. V. (2011). 2 The associative-propositional
evaluation model: theory, evidence, and open questions. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol.
44, 59–127. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-385522-0.00002-0
Gawronski, B., Morrison, M., Phills, C. E., and Galdi, S. (2017). Temporal
stability of implicit and explicit measures. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 43, 300–312.
doi: 10.1177/0146167216684131
Gawronski, B., and Sritharan, R. (2010). “Formation, change, and contextualization
of mental associations: determinants and principles of variations in implicit
measures,” in Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition: Measurement, Theory, and
Applications, eds B. Gawronski and B. K. Payne (New York, NY: Guilford Press),
216–240.
Gramzow, R. H., and Gaertner, L. (2005). Self-esteem and favoritism toward novel
in-groups: the self as an evaluative base. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 88, 801–815.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.88.5.801
Greenwald, A. G., and Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: attitudes,
self-esteem, and stereotypes. Psychol. Rev. 102, 4–27. doi: 10.1037/0033-295x.
102.1.4
Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R., Rudman, L. A., Farnham, S. D., Nosek, B. A.,
and Mellott, D. S. (2002). A unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes,
self-esteem, and self-concept. Psychol. Rev. 109, 3–25. doi: 10.1037//0033-295X.
109.1.3
Greenwald, A. G., and Farnham, S. D. (2000). Using the implicit association test
to measure self-esteem and self-concept. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 79, 1022–1038.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.79.6.1022
Greenwald, A. G., Mcghee, D. E., and Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). Measuring
individual differences in implicit cognition: the implicit association test. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 74, 1464–1480. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464
Gregg, A. P., Seibt, B., and Banaji, M. R. (2006). Easier done than undone:
asymmetry in the malleability of automatic preferences. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
90, 1–20. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.90.1.1
Grumm, M., Nestler, S., and Von Collani, G. (2009). Changing explicit and implicit
attitudes: the case of self-esteem. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 45, 327–335. doi: 10.1016/
j.jesp.2008.10.006
Hahn, A., Judd, C. M., Hirsh, H. K., and Blair, I. V. (2014). Awareness
of implicit attitudes. J. Exp. Psychol. 143, 1369–1392. doi: 10.1037/a003
5028
Hebb, D. O. (1949). Organization of Behavior. New York, NY: Wiley.
Heider, F. (1958). The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York, NY: Wiley.
doi: 10.1037/10628-000
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 April 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 479
fpsyg-09-00479 April 3, 2018 Time: 17:42 # 13
Roth et al. Cognitive Consistency Based Recategorization Model
Hewstone, M., Islam, M. R., and Judd, C. M. (1993). Models of crossed
categorization and intergroup relations. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 64, 779–793.
doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.64.5.779
Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., and Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup bias. Annu.
Rev. Psychol. 53, 575–604. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.
135109
Hofmann, W., Gawronski, B., Gschwendner, T., Le, H., and Schmitt, M. (2005).
A meta-analysis on the correlation between the implicit association test
and explicit self-report measures. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 31, 1369–1385.
doi: 10.1177/0146167205275613
Hogg, M. A., and Abrams, D. (1993). “Towards a single-process uncertainty-
reduction model of social motivation in groups,” in Group Motivation: Social
Psychological Perspectives, eds M. A. Hogg and D. Abrams (Hertfordshire:
Harvester Wheatsheaf), 173–190.
Huynh, Q.-L., Nguyen, A.-M. T. D., and Benet-Martínez, V. (2011). “Bicultural
identity integration,” in Handbook of Identity Theory and Research,
eds S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, and V. L. Vignoles (New York, NY:
Springer Science + Business Media), 827–843. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4419-
7988-9_35
International Organization for Migration (2018). World Migration Report 2018.
Geneva: International Organization for Migration.
Jetten, J., and Hutchison, P. (2011). When groups have a lot to lose: historical
continuity enhances resistance to a merger. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 41, 335–343.
doi: 10.1002/ejsp.779
Jones, J. M., and Jetten, J. (2011). Recovering from strain and enduring pain:
multiple group memberships promote resilience in the face of physical
challenges. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 2, 239–244. doi: 10.1177/194855061038
6806
Kachanoff, F. J., Ysseldyk, R., Taylor, D. M., Sablonnière, R., and Crush, J. (2016).
The good, the bad and the central of group identification: evidence of a
u-shaped quadratic relation between in-group affect and identity centrality. Eur.
J. Soc. Psychol. 46, 563–580. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.2199
Levy, N., Harmon-Jones, C., and Harmon-Jones, E. (2017). Dissonance
and discomfort: does a simple cognitive inconsistency evoke a
negative affective state? Motiv. Sci. (in press). doi: 10.1037/mot00
00079
Mann, T. C., and Ferguson, M. J. (2015). Can we undo our first impressions? The
role of reinterpretation in reversing implicit evaluations. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
108, 823–849. doi: 10.1037/pspa0000021
Olson, M. A., and Fazio, R. H. (2009). “Implicit and explicit measures of attitudes:
The perspective of the MODE model,” in Attitudes: Insights from the New
Implicit Measures, eds R. E. Petty, R. H. Fazio, and P. Briñol (New York, NY:
Psychology Press), 19–63.
Olson, M. A., Fazio, R. H., and Hermann, A. D. (2007). Reporting
tendencies underlie discrepancies between implicit and explicit measures
of self-esteem. Psychol. Sci. 18, 287–291. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.
01890.x
Osgood, C. E., and Tannenbaum, P. H. (1955). The principle of congruity in
the prediction of attitude change. Psychol. Rev. 62, 42–55. doi: 10.1037/h00
48153
Otten, S. (2003). “Me and us” or “us and them”? The self as a heuristic for
defining minimal ingroups. Eur. Rev. Soc. Psychol. 13, 1–33. doi: 10.1080/
10463280240000028
Otten, S., and Epstude, K. (2006). Overlapping mental representations
of self, ingroup, and outgroup: unraveling self-stereotyping and self-
anchoring. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 32, 957–969. doi: 10.1177/014616720628
7254
Otten, S., and Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Evidence for implicit evaluative
in-group bias: affect-biased spontaneous trait inference in a minimal
group paradigm. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 36, 77–89. doi: 10.1006/jesp.1999.
1399
Otten, S., and Wentura, D. (1999). About the impact of automaticity in the minimal
group paradigm: evidence from affective priming tasks. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 29,
1049–1071. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199912)29:8<1049::AID-EJSP985>
3.0.CO;2-Q
Otten, S., and Wentura, D. (2001). Self-anchoring and in-group favoritism: an
individual profiles analysis. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 37, 525–532. doi: 10.1006/jesp.
2001.1479
Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., and Demarree, K. G. (2007). The meta-cognitive model
(MCM) of attitudes: implications for attitude measurement, change, and
strength. Soc. Cogn. 25, 657–686. doi: 10.1521/soco.2007.25.5.657
Roccas, S., and Brewer, M. (2002). Social identity complexity. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
Rev. 6, 88–106. doi: 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0602_01
Roth, J. (2010). Easily Liked and Disliked? Formation and Change of Explicit
and Implicit Attitudes Towards Ones’s Group. Ph.D. thesis, Friedrich-Schiller-
Universität Jena, Jena.
Roth, J., and Steffens, M. C. (2014). When I becomes we: associative self-anchoring
drives implicit intergroup bias in minimal groups. Soc. Psychol. 45, 253–264.
doi: 10.1027/1864-9335/a000169
Roth, J., Steffens, M. C., Morina, N., and Stangier, U. (2012). Changed for the
worse: subjective change in implicit and explicit self-esteem in individuals with
current, past, and no posttraumatic stress disorder. Psychother. Psychosom. 81,
64–66. doi: 10.1159/000329993
Rudman, L. A. (2004). Sources of implicit attitudes. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 13,
79–82. doi: 10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00279.x
Rudman, L. A., Greenwald, A. G., and Mcghee, D. E. (2001). Implicit self-concept
and evaluative implicit gender stereotypes: self and ingroup share desirable
traits. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 27, 1164–1178. doi: 10.1177/0146167201279009
Rydell, R. J., and McConnell, A. R. (2006). Understanding implicit and explicit
attitude change: a systems of reasoning analysis. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 91,
995–1008. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.91.6.995
Rydell, R. J., McConnell, A. R., Mackie, D. M., and Strain, L. M. (2006). Of
two minds forming and changing valence-inconsistent implicit and explicit
attitudes. Psychol. Sci. 17, 954–958. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01811.x
Sanchez, A. K., Zogmaister, C., and Arcuri, L. (2007). When “they” becomes “we”:
multiple contrasting identities in mixed status groups. Self Identity 6, 154–172.
doi: 10.1080/15298860601128255
Sassenberg, K., and Matschke, C. (2010). The impact of exchange programs on
the integration of the hostgroup into the self-concept. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40,
148–159. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.621
Sassenberg, K., and Wieber, F. (2005). Don’t ignore the other half: the impact of
ingroup identification on implicit measures of prejudice. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol.
35, 621–632. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2004.10.002
Schmader, T., Johns, M., and Forbes, C. (2008). An integrated process model
of stereotype threat effects on performance. Psychol. Rev. 115, 336–356.
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.115.2.336
Smeekes, A., and Verkuyten, M. (2015). The presence of the past: identity
continuity and group dynamics. Eur. Rev. Soc. Psychol. 26, 162–202.
doi: 10.1080/10463283.2015.1112653
Strack, F., and Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social
behavior. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 8, 220–247. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr0803_1
Tajfel, H. (1974). Social identity and intergroup behaviour. Soc. Sci. Informat. 13,
65–93. doi: 10.1177/053901847401300204
Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., and Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization
and intergroup behaviour. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 1, 149–178. doi: 10.1002/ejsp.
2420010202
Todd, A. R., and Burgmer, P. (2013). Perspective taking and automatic intergroup
evaluation change: testing an associative self-anchoring account. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 104, 786–802. doi: 10.1037/a0031999
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., and Wetherell, M. S. (1987).
Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory. Cambridge, MA:
Basil Blackwell.
van Veelen, R., Otten, S., Cadinu, M., and Hansen, N. (2015). An integrative model
of social identification self-stereotyping and self-anchoring as two cognitive
pathways. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 20, 3–26. doi: 10.1177/1088868315576642
Vanhoomissen, T., and Van Overwalle, F. (2010). Me or not me as source of ingroup
favoritism and outgroup derogation: a connectionist perspective. Soc. Cogn. 28,
84–109. doi: 10.1521/soco.2010.28.1.84
Vignoles, V. L., Manzi, C., Regalia, C., Jemmolo, S., and Scabini, E. (2008).
Identity motives underlying desired and feared possible future selves. J. Pers.
76, 1165–1200. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2008.00518.x
Vignoles, V. L., Regalia, C., Manzi, C., Golledge, J., and Scabini, E. (2006). Beyond
self-esteem: influence of multiple motives on identity construction. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 90, 308–333. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.90.2.308
Wilson, T. D., Lindsey, S., and Schooler, T. Y. (2000). A model of dual attitudes.
Psychol. Rev. 107, 101–126. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.107.1.101
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 April 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 479
fpsyg-09-00479 April 3, 2018 Time: 17:42 # 14
Roth et al. Cognitive Consistency Based Recategorization Model
Wright, S. C., Aron, A., Mclaughlin-Volpe, T., and Ropp, S. A. (1997).
The extended contact effect: knowledge of cross-group friendships
and prejudice. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 73, 73–90. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.
73.1.73
Wyer, N. A. (2016). Easier done than undone. . . by some of the people, some of the
time: the role of elaboration in explicit and implicit group preferences. J. Exp.
Soc. Psychol. 63, 77–85. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2015.12.006
Yamaguchi, S., Greenwald, A. G., Banaji, M. R., Murakami, F., Chen, D.,
Shiomura, K., et al. (2007). Apparent universality of positive implicit
self-esteem. Psychol. Sci. 18, 498–500. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.
01928.x
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2018 Roth, Steffens and Vignoles. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) and the copyright owner are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 14 April 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 479
